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Deportation and Due Process: Does the
Immigration and Naturalization Act or the Fifth
Amendment Provide for Full Interpretation
of Deportation and Exclusion Hearings?
(El Rescate Legal Services v.
Executive Office for Immigration Review,
941 F.2d 950 (9th Cir. 1991))
"I know you believe you understood what you think I
said, but I am not sure you realize that what you heard
is not what I meant"
Author unknown.
Lynne Mallya*
Deportation and exclusion hearings are the administrative
proceedings through which an alien shows cause as to why he
should not be required to leave the United States, or alternatively,
proves that he is admissible to this country.' In 1988, Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) officials deported 22,848 aliens.2
This number, however, represents only a small portion of the
number of aliens that are apprehended annually and subsequently
required to leave the United States.3 Many of these aliens do not
* Lynne Mallya received a B.A. in psychology and an M.A. in educational psy-
chology from the University of Connecticut in 1978 and 1979, respectively. She will
receive a J.D. in 1993 from Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California, where she
was a staff member on the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative
Law Journal from 1991-92.
1. Joseph Minsky, Introductory Overview of Immigration Law and Practice,
C394 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1 (1989), available in WESTLAW, IM-TP Database. See discus-
sion intra text accompanying notes 28-37 for a general overview of deportation and
exclusion proceedings.
2. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 1989 SouRcEBooK OF CRiINAL JusTIcE STATISTICS,
474 (1990). The reasons for deportation include subversive or anarchistic activity,
criminal behavior, immoral behavior, violation of narcotic laws, mental or physical
defect, previous exclusion or deportation, failure to maintain or comply with condi-
tions of non-immigrant status, entry into the United States without proper docu-
ments, entry into the United States without inspection or with false statements,
becoming a public charge, inability of those over sixteen years of age to read, and
"other." Id Deportation is discussed infra text accompanying notes 25-27.
3. In 1984, for example, there were 1,246,981 aliens apprehended. U.S. DEPT.
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speak English fluently.
El Rescate Legal Services filed a class action against the Ex-
ecutive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) and, on behalf of its
clients and their class, made a motion for partial summary judg-
ment.4 Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that, when the immigration
judge rules an interpreter is necessary, the EOIR violates the stat-
utory and Constitutional due process rights of non-English speak-
ing plaintiffs by failing to interpret entire immigration court
proceedings into the alien's language.5 The policy of the EOIR is
to interpret into English only those parts of an immigration pro-
ceeding that are in a foreign language.6
The District Court for the Central District of California
granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs with respect
to their cause of action as brought under the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act and the Administrative Procedures Act.7 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court decision and
held that statutory interpretation of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act does not lead to the conclusion that immigration proceed-
ings should be interpreted in their entirety.8 The case was
remanded to the district court for determination of the constitu-
tional claims.9
This casenote examines an alien's right to full interpretation
of an immigration proceeding into the alien's language. Part I of
this casenote provides background on the structure of the INS, and
discusses the statutes that regulate pertinent INS activities. Part
II examines the Board of Immigration Appeals and circuit court
decisions that have discussed Fifth Amendment due process and
equal protection arguments in relation to immigration court pro-
ceedings. In Part III, El Rescate ii is discussed: the faulty reason-
ing behind the court of appeals' statutory interpretation of the
OF JUSTICE, 1984 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMIIGRATION AND NATURALIZA-
TION SERVICE 188 (1984). Of these, INS expelled 930,539 aliens; 912,533 were re-
quired to depart and 18,006 were deported. Id In that same year, 1221 aliens were
excluded. IMi Exclusion is discussed infra text accompanying notes 21-24.
4. El Rescate Legal Services v. Executive Office for Immigration Review, 727
F. Supp. 557 (C.D. Cal. 1989)[hereinafter El Rescate 1]. Plaintiff's class consisted of
non- and limited-English speaking persons who currently were or possibly would be
subject to immigration court proceedings in the immigration courts of Los Angeles,
San Diego and El Centro. Id- at 558 n.1.
5. Id. at 558.
6. Id at 559. The interpreting is done primarily for and at the discretion of
the immigration judge and for the creation of the record. Id. at 559-60.
7. Id. at 564. The district court did not make a ruling on the Constitutional
due process issue. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 38-49.
8. El Rescate Legal Services v. Executive Office for Immigration Review, 941
F.2d 950 (9th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter E Rescate I/].
9. Id at 956.
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Immigration and Nationality Act is examined and a
recommendation is made as to how the district court should re-
solve the Fifth Amendment issue on remand. Finally, this case-
note concludes that the statutory interpretation of the
Immigration and Nationality Act requires full translation, into the
alien's language, of the immigration proceedings where the immi-
gration judge deems it necessary to have an interpreter.
I. Overview of Immigration and Naturalization Service
Agencies Involved in INS Proceedings
The administration and enforcement of immigration laws is
assigned to the Attorney General of the United States.' 0 The At-
torney General delegates most of his immigration responsibilities
to the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the EOIR.11
The INS Commissioner, appointed by the President, has au-
thority over all matters delegated to him by the Attorney Gen-
eral.12 The four regional offices of the INS are further subdivided
into district offices.' 3 It is the district offices that institute exclu-
sion and deportation hearings.14 The legal staff at each district of-
fice are known as "general attorneys" or "trial attorneys" and
serve as prosecutors in the immigration court proceedings.' 5
The Office of the Immigration Judges and the Board of Im-
migration Appeals comprise the EOIR.16 Immigration judges hear
deportation and exclusion cases.' 7 The Board of Immigration Ap-
peals acts as the appellate authority in exclusion hearings, deporta-
tion hearings, and certain other cases. 8 There are five members
on the Board of Immigration Appeals who form panels of three to
decide appeals.19
When all administrative appeals are exhausted, the United
States Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction to review final orders of
deportation.20
10. Minsky, supra note 1 at 14.
11. id.
12. Id. at 15.
13. Id The four regional offices are designated Northern, Eastern, Southern,
and Western. Id.
14. Id.
15. Minsky, supra note 1 at 15.




20. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1970 & Supp. 1992).
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Exclusion
The method of proceeding against an alien seeking admission
to the United States is an exclusion hearing.2 ' Deportation hear-
ings are proceedings against an alien who is already physically
present in the United States. 22 To distinguish between deportation
and exclusion, exclusion can best be remembered by picturing an
alien knocking on the door; if he does not get in, he is excluded.23
There are numerous grounds for excludability of aliens from the
United States.2 4 Charging the alien with one of these grounds en-
titles him to an exclusion hearing.
Deportation
Deportation is the removal of an alien from the United
States, pursuant to an "Order to Show Cause."25 This order noti-
fies the alien of pending deportation proceedings, states the rea-
sons INS believes the alien to be deportable, and specifies the
alleged facts on which INS has determined deportability.26 The
21. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25 (1982).
22. Id Deportation and exclusion hearings differ in a number of ways. Under
8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a), if the alien loses at a deportation hearing, he may appeal di-
rectly to the Court of Appeals. An alien who loses at an exclusion proceeding may
challenge the order only by petition for writ of habeas corpus. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b).
See itfra notes 28-37 and accompanying text for further discussion of the differ-
ences between exclusion and deportation hearings.
23. Denyse Sabagh, Deportation, Exclusion, Discretionary Relief, and Waivers,
C505 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 337 (1990), available in WESTLAW, ALI-ABA Database.
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1992). A partial list of the grounds for exclusion includes
the following
1. Aliens who have a communicable disease of public health
significance;
2. Aliens who have a physical or mental disorder and behavior associ-
ated with that disorder that poses a threat to the property, safety, or
welfare of the alien or others;
3. Aliens who are drug abusers or addicts;
4. Aliens convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
5. Aliens convicted of violating any law or regulation related to a
controlled substance;
6. Aliens convicted of two or more offenses with an aggregate sen-
tence of 5 years or more;
7. Aliens coming to the United States to engage in prostitution.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).
25. Sabagh, supra note 23 at 6.
26. Id Grounds for deportation are codified in the Immigration and Nationality
Act which contains 20 provisions pertaining to this issue. Grounds for deportability
include:
1. Any alien who was excludable at the time of entry;
2. Any alien who entered the United States without inspection or is
in the United States in violation of law;
3. Any alien who is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
commited within five years after the date of entry and is sentenced to
confinement for one year or longer;
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alien must then show cause, before the immigration judge, why he
is not deportable and request any discretionary relief applicable.27
Exclusion and Deportation Hearings
The Immigration and Nationality Act enumerates the re-
quirements that must be adhered to in deportation and exclusion
hearings.28 As discussed, these two types of hearings have sepa-
rate and distinct procedures and consequences but will be collec-
tively referred to in this note as "immigration court
proceedings."29
Although civil rather than criminal in nature, the burden of
proof in a deportation hearing rests with the government to prove
deportability by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence."3 0
In addition to the rights enumerated in the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act,31 other rights are also safeguarded.32 These include
the right to continuance for good cause,33 the privilege against self-
incrimination,34 the right to make motions,3 5 and the right to des-
ignate the country of deportation.3 6
Aliens in exclusion hearings have fewer options and proce-
dural protections than those in deportation proceedings. For
instance, the excludable alien can be held in detention without
bond, has the burden of showing admissibility to the United States,
and, if found excludable, must return to the country from which
4. Any alien who has engaged, is engaged, or at any time after entry
engages in any terrorist activity,
5. Any alien who participated in Nazi persecution.
8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (Supp. 1992).
27. Sabagh, supra note 23 at 6-8.
28. Requirements for deportation hearings are found in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)
(Supp. 1992) while 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1970 & Supp. 1992) sets forth the requirements
for exclusion hearings.
29. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25-27 (1982).
30. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 277 (1966).
31. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
32. There are a number of substantive rights available to the deportable alien
which are not available to an alien denied admission in an exclusion hearing. Lan-
don, 459 U.S. at 26-27. Although there are limits, the alien being deported may gen-
erally designate the country of deportation. Id He may also choose to depart
voluntarily and thus avoid the stigma of deportation and the limitations on his se-
lection of deportation. Id Lastly, he may seek a suspension of deportation. Id.
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b); 1252(e) (Supp. 1992); 1253(a) (1970 & Supp. 1992); 1254(e)
(Supp. 1992).
33. 8 C.F.R. § 242.13 (1992).
34. Tashnizi v. INS, 585 F.2d 781, 782 (5th Cir. 1978).
35. Sabagh, supra note 23 at 7. See e.g. In re K, 5 I. & N. Dec. 347 (B.I.A.
1953)(motion to change venue); 8 C.F.R. § 242.13 (1992) (motion for continuance).
36. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1992).
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he came.37
Acts Governing the INS
A. The Immigration and Nationality Act
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides that an
alien will be given reasonable notice of the charges against him,
and of the time and place of the hearing.38 The Act grants the
alien the privilege of being represented by retained counsel.39
Most importantly, the act provides that "the alien shall have a rea-
sonable opportunity to examine the evidence against him, to pre-
sent evidence on his own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses
presented by the Government.... ,,40
Similarly, the official administrative regulations for exclusion
hearings require the immigration judge to advise the applicant
about the nature and purpose of the hearing, advise him that he is
entitled to representation by an attorney at no cost to the govern-
ment, and inform him of the availability of free legal services. 41
They also require that "the alien shall have a reasonable opportu-
37. Sabagh, supra note 23 at 4. Another difference is that excludable aliens re-
ceive closed hearings unless they request an open hearing. Id Also, the immigra-
tion judge in the exclusion proceeding has no authority to grant voluntary
departure, a remedy for the potential deportee. The alien will be excluded unless
she is allowed to withdraw her application for admission. I&
38. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (1992).
39. Id. at § (b)(2).
40. Id. at § (b) (emphasis added). The act provides the following-
(1) the alien shall be given notice, reasonable under all the circum-
stances, of the nature of the charges against him and of the time and
place at which the proceedings will be held,
(2) the alien shall have the privilege of being represented (at no ex-
pense to the Government) by such counsel, authorized to practice in
such proceedings, as he shall choose,
(3) the alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine the evi-
dence against him, to present evidence on his own behalf, and to cross-
examine witnesses presented by the Government, and
(4) no decision of deportability shall be valid unless it is based upon
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence.
Id-
41. Id. The regulation states that the immigration judge must do the following:
[]nform the applicant of the nature and purpose of the hearing, advise
him of the privilege of being represented by an attorney of his own
choice at no expense to the Government, and of the availability of free
legal services programs qualified under Part 292a of this chapter and
organizations recognized pursuant to § 292.2 of this chapter located in
the district where his exclusion hearing is to be held; and shall ascer-
tain that the applicant has received a list of such programs; and re-
quest him to ascertain then and there whether he desires
representation; advise him that he will have a reasonable opportunity
to present evidence in his own behalf, to examine and object to evi-
dence against him, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the
Government; and place the applicant under oath. Id
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nity to examine the evidence against him, to present evidence on
his own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the
Government."42
The Administrative Procedures Act and Its Interaction
With the Immigration and Nationality Act
Under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), "[a] person
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely af-
fected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a rele-
vant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."4 3 This statute
has two components. First, there must be an agency action that af-
fects the complainant in the specified manner.4 Section 551 de-
fines agency action as "the whole or a part of an agency rule,
order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof,
or failure to act."45 Second, the party seeking review must show
that he has "suffer[ed] legal wrong" because of the challenged
agency action, or is "adversely affected or aggrieved" by that ac-
tion "within the meaning of a relevant statute."46
The Supreme Court has recognized that a statute has a "zone
of interests" it is designed to protect.47 In order to show he has
been "adversely affected or aggrieved [by] a statute, the injured
party must establish that the injury he complains of ... falls
within the 'zone of interests' sought to be protected by the statu-
tory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for his com-
plaint."48 By definition, therefore, the APA is only applicable in
those actions in which a relevant statute has been violated and
that violation "forms the legal basis for the complaint."49
Plaintiffs' Cause of Action Under the Administrative
Procedures Act
Based on the above rationale, for the APA to apply to El
Rescate, plaintiffs would have had to show that the EOIR policy of
failing to interpret entire immigration court proceedings for non-
English speaking aliens violated a statutory provision of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act. The district and appellate courts dif-
fered in their conclusions as to whether the EOIR had violated the
42. Id (emphasis added).
43. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1992).
44. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 882-83 (1990).
45. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1992).
46. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1992).
47. See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1987).
48. Lujan, 497 U.S. at 883 (citing Clarke, 479 U.S. at 396-97).
49. Id. at 882-83.
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Act, and therefore ruled differently as to the legitimacy of plain-
tiffs' cause of action under the APA. The district court, finding a
statutory violation under the Immigration and Nationality Act,
granted partial summary judgment to plaintiffs' third cause of ac-
tion brought under the APA.50 The court of appeals reversed,
holding that the policy did not violate the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act and there was no violation of the APA.51
H. Prior Caselaw on the Right to Interpretation
Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) has examined the
question of the right to an interpreter at immigration court pro-
ceedings in several decisions.5 2 In Matter of Exilus, the Board of
Immigration Appeals considered whether due process required
INS to provide consecutive and full translation of an applicant's
exclusion proceeding.53 The Board of Immigration Appeals held
that an alien is entitled to a fair hearing but that due process does
not require the translation of an entire proceeding. They indi-
cated that only certain portions of a proceeding require transla-
tion, including: the immigration judge's statements to the alien,
the examination of the alien by his counsel, the attorney for the
Service, and the immigration judge, and the alien's responses to
their questions.5 5 They further concluded that the immigration
judge, at his own discretion, may decide if it is essential for the
alien to understand other dialogue that may be essential to the
alien's ability to assist in the presentation of her case.5 6
The Board of Immigration Appeals further elaborated on the
50. E Rescate I, 727 F. Supp. at 564.
51. El Rescate II, 941 F.2d at 956. "There is no right to sue for a violation of the
APA in the absence of a 'relevant statute' whose violation 'forms the legal basis for
[the] complaint.'" Id
52. See In re Tomas, 19 I. & N. Dec. 464 (BIA 1987); In re Exilus, 18 I. & N.
Dec. 276 (BIA 1982).
53. 18 . & N. Dec. at 80. Applicant, a citizen of Haiti, appealed a decision of the
immigration judge that denied her application for asylum. Her appeal alleged, inter
alia, that her motion for simultaneous translation of the entire immigration court
proceeding was erroneously denied and resulted in a denial of her due process
rights to a fair hearing. Id at 276, 280. She contended that her inability to under-
stand the entire proceeding, by virtue of the judge delegating authority to the inter-
preter to determine when translation was necessary, prejudiced her case. I& at 280.
The Board of Immigration Appeals noted that after her motion was made, there
was no part of the hearing that was not either translated or explained to the appli-
cant. Id at 280-81. They concluded, therefore, that her contention of denial of a
fair hearing was completely without merit. Id at 281.
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due process requirements with respect to interpretation of immi-
gration court proceedings in Matter of Tomas. 57 They found that
the presence of a competent interpreter for an alien defendant
who cannot speak fluent English is important to the fundamental
fairness of a hearing.58 Though the Board reaffirmed that due pro-
cess does not require the translation of the entire proceeding, they
specified that due process requires that respondents "must be able
to participate meaningfully in certain phases of their own
hearing."5 9
The Board of Immigration Appeals noted in In re Tomas that
reliance on the daughter of the respondents as an interpreter for
the Spanish of the official interpreter into the native Kanjobal lan-
guage of the respondents, violated due process.6 0 The Board of Im-
migration Appeals indicated that there is a great difference
between the ability to understand a language and the ability to
fully translate thoughts from one language to another.61
These decisions failed to address the statutory interpretation
of the necessity to give the alien a "reasonable opportunity to ex-
amine the evidence against him" as delineated by the Immigration
and Nationality Act.62 They are, however, reflective of the Board
of Immigration Appeals' position regarding full interpretation of
immigration court proceedings as a requirement of due process.
Specifically, these decisions show that the Board of Immigration
Appeals believes that a full interpretation of immigration court
proceedings is not justified.
57. 19 . & N. Dec. 464 (BIA 1987). The respondents in this case were citizens of
Guatemala who spoke Kanjobal. I A Spanish interpreter was present at the de-
portation hearing and the judge determined that the respondents' 15 year old
daughter, who spoke both Kanjobal and Spanish, could adequately assist in present-
ing the respondents' case. Respondents appealed on the basis that they were not
given a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on their own behalf. I- The
Board of Immigration Appeals stated that "a desire to avoid excessive continuances
is not sufficient reason to allow a hearing to proceed where the right of a respon-
dent to present testimony may be abridged" and remanded the case to the immigra-
tion judge. Id.
58. Id- See also Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 726 (9th Cir. 1980)(dictum),
reh'g denied, 665 F.2d 269 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994 (1982); Niarchos
v. INS, 393 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1968)(dictum); Gonzales v. Zurbrick, 45 F.2d 934 (6th
Cir. 1930).
59. In re Tomas, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 464. See In re Exilus, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 281.
60. In re Tomas, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 464. The court insisted the daughter act in
this capacity despite her disclaiming her ability to perform this role. Id.
61. Id. at 464. The Board of Immigration Appeals noted that this task would
tax the skill of even a professional interpreter. Id.
62. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1992). See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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The Federal Courts: Interpretation and Due Process
The Second Circuit
The federal courts have rendered several decisions that ex-
plore the failure to interpret immigration court and other proceed-
ings. One of the earlier and often cited cases addressing
translation for criminal proceedings is United States ex rel. Negron
v. New York 63 (Negron). In this case, Negron neither spoke nor
understood English and his lawyer spoke no Spanish.64 An inter-
preter, who simultaneously translated Spanish into English for the
benefit of the court, prosecution and jury, was present at the
trial.65 Just twenty minutes before trial, the court provided an in-
terpreter to enable Negron to confer with his lawyer.68 During the
course of the trial, the court interpreter met twice with Negron
and his lawyer, for ten to twenty minutes each time, and summa-
rized the testimony of some of the witnesses for Negron's bene-
fit.67 Other than these few instances, the proceedings were never
translated from English into Spanish for Negron during the course
of the trial.68
Prior to this decision, there was very little case law on
point.69 The court, with little or no precedent on which to rely, ac-
knowledged that Negron "deserved more than to sit in total in-
comprehension" as his trial progressed.70 The court in Negron
63. 434 F.2d 386 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). Negron, a native of Puerto Rico, entered the
United States for the second time in 1966. He had been here only a few months
when he got into a verbal altercation with his house-mate, DelValle. During this
altercation, Negron fatally stabbed DelValle. H at 387. Negron was arrested,
charged and convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty years to
life. Id at 387-88. Negron exhausted his opportunities for direct review and then
filed a pro se application for writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern District of New
York. Id at 388. The Judge granted Negron's release subject to the states' preroga-
tive to appeal or retry within a thirty day period. Id The state took the appeal
within the allotted time. I&
64. Id Negron's lawyer testifed that without an interpreter he was unable to
speak with Negron "at all." Id at 388 n.2.
65. Id The interpreter, when not translating Spanish into English, remained
"on call" at her home. I Therefore, none of the testimony presented in English
was interpreted for Negron while the trial was in progress. Id
66. Icl
67. Id. The interpreter also translated the trial court instructions at the begin-
ning of the trial regarding Negron's right to make peremptory challenges. Id
68. Negron, 434 F.2d at 388. Twelve of the fourteen witnesses called against
Negron testified in English, rendering a large portion of the proceedings incompre-
hensible to the non-English speaking defendant. Id.
69. Id at 389.
70. Ha at 390. The court further stated that "particularly inappropriate in this
nation where many languages are spoken is a callousness to the crippling language
handicap of a newcomer to its shores, whose life and freedom the state by its crimi-
nal processes chooses to put in jeopardy." Id
[Vol. 11:181
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required that once a court is put on notice of a defendant's diffi-
culty with the English language, it must inform the defendant of
his right to a competent translator, available at state expense if
need be, throughout his trial.71
Fourteen years later, the Second Circuit discussed both statu-
tory and due process rights in the context of deportation proceed-
ings in the case of Augustin v. Sava.72 Augustin's counsel spoke
no Creole. Augustin spoke no English and the translation services
provided by INS were inadequate at best.73 Augustin's counsel re-
quested a continuance from the immigration judge so that she
would have time to obtain material she had requested from the
translating service.74 She explained that without these materials
she did not know who to call to substantiate Augustin's persecu-
tion claim.7S The motion, though unopposed, was denied by the
immigration judge, whereupon, in protest, counsel withdrew from
representing Augustin.76 The court never informed Augustin of
the denial of the continuance or that his counsel had withdrawn.77
The Second Circuit held that the hearing denied Augustin of
certain procedural rights protected by statute, INS regulations and
the Constitution.7 8 The limited translation that did occur was
deemed to be so "nonsensical" that it put into doubt the accuracy
and scope of the proceeding.79 It also gave rise to a question
whether Augustin understood the nature and finality of the hear-
ing.8 0 The court quoted, with approval, a Ninth Circuit decision
that indicated that "[i]t is particularly important that an applicant
71. Id at 391.
72. 735 F.2d 32 (2nd Cir. 1984). Augustin was an Haitian refugee who claimed
that he came to the United States to escape political persecution by the Haitian gov-
ernment. The boat on which he escaped Haiti sank off the Florida coast. Augustin
survived, but was arrested as he walked into town after making his way to shore.
Id. at 34.
73. Id. The translator who assisted Augustin in filling out the asylum form in-
dicated that Augustin had fled Haiti for fear of arrest because his uncle had a "dis-
ease." Id. His counsel twice provided the translator with a series of written
questions to be returned to her with Augustin's answers. Id. Counsel did not re-
ceive the answers in time to properly prepare for the hearing. Id at 35 n.3. When
the translator asked Augustin if he was a native of Haiti, his answer was translated
by the interpreter as "I am not married yet, but I know I am a Haitian." Id When
asked if he had anything else to add, the translated response was "He said because I
said everything before and then I have nothing to say today. I will come back again
here to call me for the other hearing." Id.
74. Id at 34-35.
75. Id. at 35.
76. Id.
77. Id.





for relief.., have a reasonable opportunity to present his proofs,
for the stakes are high."81
The Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of due process and fair
deportation hearings in Gonzales v. Zurbrick.82 Gonzales claimed
that, during the INS questioning to ascertain her deportability sub-
sequent to her arrest, she did not understand the translation of the
interpreter, Le Doulx, who had questioned her regarding allega-
tions that she had engaged in certain activities.83 She claimed that
she made several incriminating answers due to the incompetency
of the interpreter and her inability to understand him, and these
answers were not true.8 4
The court considered the testimony of Le Doulx, the results
of Spanish reading and speaking tests they had him complete, and
all other testimony in the record, and concluded that Le Doulx
"was unable to interpret in a manner calculated to insure the alien
a fair hearing."8 5 The court stated "[t]he function of an inter-
preter is an important one. It affects a constitutional right. The
right to a hearing is a vain thing if the alien is not understood. De-
portation is fraught with serious consequences."8 6
The Seventh Circuit
In the case of Niarchos v. INS, Niarchos, a Greek crewman,
jumped ship in Canada and entered the United States a year
later.87 A show cause order issued against him in 1967 alleged that
81. Id., citing Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 108 (9th Cir. 1969). Kovac is discussed
infra, note 98 and accompanying text.
82. 45 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1930). The alien, Helen Gonzales, was arrested during
a liquor raid conducted at her place of residence. Id. She was questioned through
an interpreter, Le Doulx, by INS at police headquarters and she initially denied an
involvement with prostitution. Id at 935. After another housemate testified that
she (the housemate) was a prostitute, the INS, through the interpreter, again ques-
tioned Gonzales. Id. This time, Gonzales indicated that she was a prostitute. Id
At her hearing, Le Doulx was again the interpreter, but this time Gonzales indi-
cated she was unable to understand him. Id Le Doulx was replaced by another
and then a third interpreter. I During the hearing, Gonzales testified that she
had never engaged in prostitution and that she had not understood the questions
when presented by Le Doulx. Id.
83. Id-
84. Id- at 936. Le Doulx, a Frenchman, testified that he learned to "speak Mex-
ican" while working as a jeweler in Egypt where he occasionally met Mexicans and
others who had resided in Mexico. I& The court subjected him to reading and
speaking tests to test his competency. Id.
85. Id-
86. Id- at 937.
87. Niarchos v. INS, 393 F.2d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 1968).
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he was deportable.8 8 The order noted that Niarchos had entered
the United States as a visitor, but without the requisite crossing
card, and had been deported five years earlier.8 9 Petitioner did not
challenge the order but alleged that the court should reverse his
1962 deportation because he was not provided with an interpreter
at that hearing.90
The court denied the petition on other grounds but in dicta it
discussed the need for fundamental fairness in deportation hear-
ings. They noted that although INS has discretion "in dealing with
violations of the crewman provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq., it
would seem clearly not within the Service's discretion to conduct
an official inquiry, without an interpreter, in a language the sub-
ject of the inquiry [could] neither understand nor speak."91 The
court, referring to the lack of translation at the prior hearing, fur-
ther indicated that if petitioner were to appeal to the Attorney
General for reentry, the Attorney General should consider his pe-
tition in light of the "shocking circumstances" surrounding the
1962 deportation proceeding.92
The Ninth Circuit
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has addressed this issue on sev-
eral prior occasions. The court in Tejeda-Mata v. INS held that the
immigration judge abused his discretion by not permitting simulta-
neous translation of testimony against the defendant, by either de-
fendant's counsel or an official interpreter.9 3 The court noted that,
despite the fact that deportation hearings are considered civil
rather than criminal in nature, it was well established that an
alien charged with entering the United States illegally is entitled
88. Id
89. Id.
90. Id. Unless the previous deportation order were reversed, petitioner would
be unable to apply for reentry into the United States without the permission of the
Attorney General. Id.
91. Id. at 511.
92. Id.
93. 626 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994 (1982). Tejeda-Mata, a
native of Mexico, was arrested after an immigration officer, recognizing an alien
who was subject to voluntary departure three weeks earlier, stopped to speak to
that alien and was approached by petitioner who owned the car in which the other
alien was riding. Id. at 723. The officer informed both parties that he was an immi-
gration official and, after questioning petitioner in Spanish, determined that peti-
tioner was from Mexico. Id. Petitioner refused to sign a voluntary departure form
and was subsequently arrested. Id At Tejeda-Mata's deportation hearing, the of-
ficer was the only witness offered by the government. Id. Petitioner's counsel re-
quested that an official interpreter be provided or alternatively, that he be
permitted to simultaneously translate for his client. Id. Both requests were inex-
plicably denied. Id. at 726.
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to a full and fair hearing prior to deportation.94 The court also
stated that a fundamentally fair hearing necessitates the presence
of an interpreter if the alien cannot speak fluent English.9S
In Orozco-Rangel v. INS, the Ninth Circuit approved of the
presence of an interpreter.96 In assessing whether the deportation
hearing comported with due process requirements, the court con-
sidered the presence of the official interpreter at the proceedings
despite the fact that the petitioners admitted the essential charges
forming the basis for the deportation order.97 This demonstrates
the court's belief that fundamental fairness dictates an interpreter
be provided when deemed necessary by the immigration judge.
The Ninth Circuit recognized the high stakes present for the
alien in deportation and exclusion hearings in Kovac v. INS s98 In
discussing Kovac's inability to understand English, the court noted
that all of his testimony was "elicited under interrogation through
an interpreter, by a trial attorney, whose funcion [sic] at deporta-
tion hearings is to represent the government, not the alien."99
Kovac asserted that he was unable to understand the nature of the
proceedings and the meaning of the questions presented to him.100
Because of his lack of understanding, he was also unable to convey
the full basis for his fear of persecution when answering the attor-
ney's questions.Ol The court expressed "grave doubt" whether the
hearing was conducted in such a way as to give Kovac a reasonable
opportunity to present his proofs, given the high stakes
involved.102
94. Id- at 726. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49-51 (1950); Gar-
cia-Jaramillo v. INS, 604 F.2d 1236, 1239 (9th Cir. 1979).
95. Tejeda-Mata, 626 F.2d at 726. See Niarchos, 393 F.2d at 511; Orozco-Rangel
v. INS, 528 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1976); Leung v. INS, 531 F.2d 166, 168 (3d Cir. 1976);
Haidar v. Coomey, 401 F. Supp. 717, 720 (D. Mass. 1974). The court regretfully held
that despite the judge's abuse of discretion and inherent lack of fairness in failing
to provide an interpreter, the error was harmless because the untranslated testi-
mony only confirmed petitioner's admission of alienage. Teeda-Mata, 626 F.2d at
727. The court limited this holding to the specific circumstances of the case. IR
96. 528 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1976).
97. Id, at 224.
98. 407 F.2d 102, 108. Kovac, a Yugoslavian citizen, claimed that he had been
discriminated against and would be subject to physical persecution in his native
country because of his Hungarian background. Id at 104. A crewman on a Yugo-
slavian vessel, he sought political asylum after his ship docked in the United States.
Id. The court noted that Kovac did not speak English and was unable to fully un-
derstand the proceeding but it overruled the Board of Immigration Appeal's deci-
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III. El Rescate Legal Services v. Executive Office for Immigration
Review
Statement of the Case and Procedural History
The District Court Decision
Plaintiffs filed a class action against the Executive Office for
Immigration Review.10 3 They alleged that failure to interpret the
entire deportation or exclusion proceeding deprives the class mem-
bers of their statutory rights under the Immigration and National-
ity Act.104 These include the right to a reasonable opportunity to
present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and be represented and
effectively assisted by retained counsel. 0 5 They also alleged that
the EOIR policy of failing to fully translate immigration court pro-
ceedings violated the Fifth Amendment due process and equal pro-
tection guarantees.' 0 6 Finally, the complaint alleged that the
practice violates the APA.107
The EOIR, in a deposition submitted to the district court, in-
dicated that their policy is to translate only those portions of the
proceeding that are "related to a witness, whether it be a respon-
dent or another witness needing language translation... and [the]
primary purpose is to assure that the official record will be avail-
able for review in English."'' 0 They further indicated that no poli-
cies exist to interpret a witness' English testimony to Spanish (or
any other language) for the benefit of the alien.109 Finally, they
showed they had policies of interpreting counsels' arguments, in-
terpreting counsel's objections, or interpreting the judge's
decision.11o
According to the EOIR, if the judge decides that there is a
need for an interpreter because the alien speaks little or no Eng-
lish, the interpreter serves the sole function of translating the for-
eign language into English. This translation is for the record, so
that those reviewing the decision have a full record in English."'
According to the EOIR, justification for this policy of less
than full translation derives from the notion that if counsel repre-
sents the alien the need for interpretation is mitigated, especially
103. E Rescate II, 941 F.2d at 952.
104. Hd
105. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1992). See discussion supra text accompanying notes 38-
51.
106. El Rescate II, 941 F.2d at 952.
107. Id-
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if counsel speaks the client's language.1 ' 2 Defendants assured the
district court that, if the alien is not represented by counsel, the
policy is to interpret the entire proceeding. 13 The EOIR based its
third argument on economic reasons: additional judges and support
staff would be needed to provide such a service.114
The District Court for the Central District of California eas-
ily dismissed these justifications and suggested that the EOIR, for
numerous reasons, balks at full interpretation of immigration pro-
ceedings.115 The court held that the Immigration and Nationality
Act should be construed to require that the entire immigration
court proceedings be interpreted when the immigration judge con-
cludes that an interpreter is necessary.1 1 6 It held that violating the
statutory provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act also
violated the Administrative Procedures Act.117 The district court
granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs on these is-
sues.118 The court permanently enjoined the EOIR "from failing
to provide for interpretation of the entire proceedings in immigra-
tion court when an immigration judge concludes that an inter-
preter is required for non- or limited-English speaking class
members."119
Defendants appealed to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals on
the grounds that plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative
remedies. 120 They also alleged that the organizational plaintiffs
112. Id at 563.
113. El Rescate I, 727 F. Supp. at 563. The district court noted that the testimony
given by immigration judges and immigration court interpreters belied this asser-
tion, at least at the lower level of the immigration court proceedings. Id.
114. Id
115. Id.
116. Id. at 564.
117. Id. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 38-51.
118. El Rescate I, 727 F. Supp at 564. The District Court granted partial sum-
mary judgment to the plaintiffs' first and third causes of action, brought under the
Immigration and Nationality Act and the Administrative Procedures Act, respec-
tively. Id. The court discussed plaintiffs' second cause of action, i.e., the Constitu-
tional claims, in dicta, but did not make a ruling as to the effect these claims should
have. Id at 562-63.
119. El Rescate II, 941 F.2d at 952.
120. Id. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1992) states that "[a]n order of deportation or of ex-
clusion shall not be reviewed by any court if the alien has not exhausted the admin-
istrative remedies available to him as of right under the immigration laws and
regulations." The court of appeals noted that this requirement is coextensive with
§ ll05a(a) which names the courts of appeals as the exclusive means of reviewing
final orders of deportation. El Rescate II, 941 F.2d at 953. The court concluded that
exhaustion of administrative remedies is statutorily required only when attacking a
final order of deportation or exclusion. Id. The court distinguished between its ju-
risdiction to rule on the merits of individual deportation orders and its jurisdiction
to rule on alleged patterns or practices of Constitutional or statutory violations. Id.
After analyzing a number of decisions from the Ninth and other circuits, the court
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lacked standing.' 2 ' The court dismissed both arguments in favor
of plaintiffs and then discussed the statutory requirements of the
Immigration and Nationality Act.122 The court held that the Im-
migration and Nationality Act does not require translation of the
entire immigration proceeding.23 It also held that as there was no
violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act, there could be
no violation under the Administrative Procedures Act.124 The
court declined to address the due process and equal protection
claims because the district court did not address them. 2 5 The case
was remanded to the district court for consideration of the Consti-
tutional claims.' 26
The Court of Appeals' Decision
Courts generally accord great deference to an executive de-
held that there was no statutory requirement of exhaustion because the appellees
were not challenging final deportation orders, but were challenging a "blanket pro-
vision on constitutional and statutory grounds .... ." Id. See also National Center
for Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v. INS, 913 F.2d 1350, 1352 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. granted
in part, 111 S. Ct. 1412 (1991).
When exhaustion is not mandated statutorily, the court applies a prudential ex-
haustion requirement in cases in which:
(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to gener-
ate a proper record and reach a proper decision;
(2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate by-
pass of the administrative scheme; and
(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its
own mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review.
Montes v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 531, 537 (9th Cir. 1990)(quoting United States v.
California Care Corp., 709 F.2d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 1983)).
The court of appeals found that the first two requirements were inapplicable
because further development of the record was not necessary and because a district
court would have jurisdiction only in the rare cases that alleged a pattern or prac-
tice of violating the rights of a class of applicants. El Rescate II, 941 F.2d at 954
(quoting Montes, 919 F.2d at 537). With respect to the third requirement, the court
noted that the Board of Immigration Appeals had previously announced and reaf-
firmed its policy regarding translation of immigration proceedings and its under-
standing of the requirements of the Due Process Clause in Matter of Exilus, 18 1 &
N Dec. at 280-81 (BIA 1982) and Matter of Tomas, Interim Dec. # 3032 (BIA Aug.
6, 1987)("[A]ll of the hearing need not be translated for the hearing to be fair ....
See Matter of Exilus."). El Rescate II, 941 F.2d at 954. In light of these prior Board
of Immigration Appeals decisions, the court felt that it would be futile to require
plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies by first bringing their claims to
the Board of Immigration Appeals. Id
121. El Rescate I, 941 F.2d at 954-55. The court of appeals termed this issue
moot because the scope of the injunction was no broader than it would have been
had the class members been the only plaintiffs. Id. They also stated that the orga-
nizations alleged sufficient injury to support standing. Id. at 955.
122. Id. at 955-56. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
123. Id. at 956.
124. 1d
125. Id.
126. El Rescate I, 941 F.2d at 956.
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partment's construction of a statute when that department is
charged with administering the statute.127 Review of an agency's
construction of a statute that it is empowered to administer must
confront two initial questions.128 First, has Congress directly spo-
ken to the precise question at issue?129 If so, the court must defer
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.13 0 If the court
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise ques-
tion at issue, the court still does not impose its own construction
on the statute.131 The court will look to the administrative
agency's interpretation of the statute to determine whether the
agency's interpretation is based on a permissible construction of
the statute.132
Second, has Congress explicitly left a gap for the agency to
fill?-33 If yes, Congress delegates to the agency the authority to
clarify the provision of the statute which it leaves ambiguous.134
The agency does this through regulation.135 If agency regulations
are not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute,
they are given great weight.'3 6
If Congress implicitly delegates authority to an agency on a
particular question, a reasonable interpretation made by the
agency's administrator controls.137 In such a case, the court may
not substitute its own construction of the statutory provision. 3 8
The appeals court acknowledged that it should give deference
to the Board of Immigration Appeals' interpretation of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act.13 9 On the specific question of transla-
tion of immigration court proceedings, however, the Board of
Immigration Appeals had only determined those requirements im-
posed by the Due Process Clause.140 They had never considered,
however, the requirements imposed by the Immigration and Na-
127. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984) ("[C]onsiderable weight should be accorded to an executive department's
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer...
128. Id- at 842.
129. Id
130. IM. at 842-43.
131. Id. at 843.
132. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
133. Id. at 843-44.
134. Id
135. Id-
136. Id. at 844.
137. Id.
138. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984).
139. El Rescate II, 941 F.2d at 954.
140. Id. at 955. The Board of Immigration Appeals has announced and reaf-
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tionality Act.141 Because the Board of Immigration Appeals's posi-
tion on the due process issues appeared set and a decision from
them regarding their statutory interpretation of the Immigration
and Nationality Act would be highly predictable, the court held
that it would be futile and inefficient to allow the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals to consider the question first.142 The court there-
fore claimed jurisdiction to resolve these statutory issues despite
the fact that the Board of Immigration Appeals had never consid-
ered them.143
The court then enumerated the various provisions covering
deportation and exclusion hearings. They noted that aliens must
have a "reasonable opportunity to be present" at their deportation
proceedings.144 In both exclusion and deportation proceedings, an
alien has "the privilege of being represented (at no expense to the
Government), by such counsel... as he shall choose."145 The alien
must also be given a reasonable opportunity to examine the evi-
dence against him, to present evidence in his own behalf, and to
cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government.146
The court then examined the requirements that an alien
must be given a reasonable opportunity to be present, to examine
and present evidence, and to provide his own representation.147
They concluded that the statute does not deny an alien a right to
provide his own translator.148 Therefore, the EOIR's failure to
provide an interpreter does not undermine the alien's reasonable
firmed its policy on translation of immigration proceedings and its understanding of
the requirements of the Due Process Clause. La
141. IcL See Matter of Exius, 18 . & N. Dec. at 276; Tomes, Interim Dec. #3032.
See supra part II for a discussion of the cases that examine due process issues re-
lated to translation of immigration court proceedings. Plaintiffs contend that the
EOIR and the Board of Immigration Appeals have no discretion to decide whether
a hearing should be fully interpreted because the Immigration and Nationality Act
requires full interpretation. The court of appeals considered this a question of stat-
utory interpretation and therefore decided the issue de novo. El Rescate II, 941 F.2d
at 955. Courts give deference when an agency applies a statute to particular facts
but not in a pure statutory construction question. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421, 445-48 (1987). Courts decide issues of pure statutory construction. Id. See also
Briggs v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1132, 1144-45 (9th Cir. 1989)(no deference was due
where plaintiffs did "not contend that the Secretary's discretionary judgment was
wrong, they claim(ed) he has no discretion under the statute to make any judgment
in the first place.").
142. El Rescate , 941 F.2d at 954.
143. Id- at 955.
144. I& (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)) (1992).
145. Id- (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)) (1992).
146. Id (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3) (1988)).




opportunity to be present.14 9 The court extended this rationale to
the other rights granted by the Immigration and Nationality
Act.150
The Due Process Issue on Remand
After finding that the Immigration and Nationality Act does
not require full interpretation of immigration court proceedings,
the court of appeals remanded the matter to the district court to
determine the disposition of the plaintiffs' due process claims.151
Plaintiffs' claim alleged that the EOIR policy against full interpre-
tation violates the Fifth Amendment's due process and equal pro-
tection guarantees.15 2 In light of the aforementioned cases, the
district court on remand should determine that these guarantees
are violated by the EOIR policy of partial or, for many parts of the
proceeding, no translation. The court should require full transla-
tion of the proceeding in order to ensure due process for aliens in
immigration court proceedings.
The Supreme Court has noted that, while not a criminal pro-
ceeding, deportation often results in a most serious penalty by de-
priving an individual of the opportunity to stay, live and work in
the United States.153 They state "[m]eticulous care must be exer-
cised lest the procedure by which he is deprived of that liberty not
meet the essential standards of fairness."'15 4
Statutorily, essential standards of fairness include the right to
counsel, the right to present evidence, and the right to cross ex-
amine witnesses. 155 For federal and criminal proceedings the
Court Interpreters Act provides for full translation and requires
the use of a certified and otherwise qualified interpreter.156 The
fact that translation is a statutory requirement in these types of
cases implies that translation is an element of essential fairness.
If an interpreter would be required by the federal court ulti-
mately hearing the alien's appeal, then logically, an interpreter
should be required at every step of the process. This would meet
the requirement of essential fairness, and might lead to greater ju-
dicial efficiency in these types of matters because fewer cases
149. Id- at 955-56.
150. Id- at 955.
151. Id at 956.
152. Id
153. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945).
154. I&
155. See supnm notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
156. Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1827(k) (Supp. 1989).
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would be appealed based on a claim of incomplete understanding
of the proceedings.
The Board of Immigration Appeals has also acknowledged
that due process entitles an alien to a fair hearing.157 Cases that
examine the question of interpretation and due process rights
agree that interpretation is an element of fundamental fairness. 5 8
The question to be answered then, is whether full translation is
essential to fundamental fairness.
The Arguments
The EOIR employed faulty reasoning in justifying its policy
of not requiring full translation of immigration court proceedings.
The district court convincingly refuted each argument.-5 9
The first of the EOIR's arguments was that if counsel repre-
sents the alien, the need for translation is mitigated, especially if
counsel speaks the alien's language.160 The district court noted
that counsel for an alien who happens to speak the alien's lan-
guage should not have to, and indeed, cannot effectively address
the court and simultaneously translate his statements to the
alien.16' Any attempt to do so would severely disadvantage that
alien who cannot provide a separate interpreter.
There may be many reasons why an alien hires an attorney
who speaks his language, but it is unlikely that one of those rea-
sons is that he expects counsel to wear two hats and translate
everything in addition to advocating zealously for the alien.162
There is no guarantee that the alien has hired counsel who speaks
his language or dialect fluently. 6 3 The alien may wish to be rep-
resented by an attorney who has a high success rate with this type
of proceeding, for example, but who coincidentally does not speak
the alien's language. He should not be prevented from hiring such
counsel simply because it has been left to him to provide his own
interpreter and he cannot afford to pay.
"Fundamental" is defined as having innate or ingrained char-
acteristics and relating to essential structure, function or facts.164
157. See supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
158. See id.




163. Id. In this case, three out of the five class representatives had counsel who
spoke Spanish. Id. Even here, then, 40% were represented by counsel who did not
speak their language.
164. WEBsTER's NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 465 (1973).
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Fundamental fairness therefore, should be inherent in the proce-
dural aspects of the hearing. In an immigration court proceeding,
the burden is on the government to prove the alien should be de-
ported from the United States.165 Asking the alien to provide his
own interpreter essentially gives the alien, rather than the govern-
ment, the responsibility to ensure the fundamental fairness of his
own hearing. This policy does nothing toward ensuring fundamen-
tal fairness and, in fact, may hinder the system by encouraging
aliens to provide incompetent translators in order to preserve an
issue for appeal. It would seem almost essential to have some
mechanism for certifying each aliens' translator prior to a hearing.
Certification may help avoid an increase in the number of appeals
due to an alien's lack of understanding of proceedings because of
self-provided "incompetent" translators. Even those aliens who
sincerely attempt to provide an adequate translator may find that
person less competent than they, or the court, anticipated.16 6 Cer-
tification of an "outsider," however, seems redundant when a pre-
viously certified interpreter is already present in the courtroom to
translate for the record. This translator could just as easily be re-
quired to translate for the alien's benefit.167
Defendants also claimed that providing interpreters would re-
sult in a substantial cost increase for the INS.168 The district court
dismissed this argument, noting that it was unable to discern how
requiring an interpreter, already present and paid to do a job, to
also translate for the alien, would increase the costs of the pro-
ceeding.169 The court noted that defendants seemed overly con-
cerned about administrative convenience and bureaucratic
guidelines and showed an appalling "lack of concern" for the
rights of the alien and the fundamental fairness of the
proceeding.170
165. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
166. See In re Thomas, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 464. The alien's daughter, who spoke
Spanish and Kanjobal was nevertheless unable to adequately translate the proceed-
ing. Id. The court held that the proceeding thus lacked the fundamental fairness
required by due process. Id. at 465.
167. Some may feel that the alien should then be responsible for the costs associ-
ated with the official translator. As many aliens are unable to afford legal assist-
ance, it would also seem likely that many would be unable to defray translation
expenses.
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Analysis of the Court of Appeals' Statutory Interpretation of the
Immigration and Nationality Act
The court of appeals stated that because plaintiffs did not
demonstrate that they were prevented from providing their own
translators, they were not denied a reasonable opportunity to exer-
cise their statutory rights.171 They supported this statement with
excerpts from two cases. In the first case, the court indicated that
"[ain immigration judge simply cannot be responsible for ensuring
the presence of an alien or his counsel... when the alien has rea-
sonable opportunity to be present."'17 2 The second case allegedly
supported the proposition that plaintiffs were not denied a reason-
able opportunity to exercise their statutory rights.17 3 The court of
appeals indicated that the cases stood for the proposition that
"[w]hen one voluntarily chooses not to attend a deportation hear-
ing which may affect him adversely, he is hardly in a position to
complain that an Order made pursuant to the hearing is invalid be-
cause of his absence."'174
These cases discussed whether an alien had a reasonable op-
portunity to be present at his hearing. The court failed to explain
how these cases relate to the proposition that failure to translate
immigration court proceedings is not a denial of a reasonable op-
portunity for an alien to exercise his statutory rights to be present,
to examine the evidence against him, to cross examine witnesses,
to be represented by retained counsel, and to present evidence in
his own behalf. The cases interpreted the notice requirement of
the Immigration and Nationality Act175 but bear no relation to the
provision in question.176
The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause "applies in de-
portation [hearings] and requires that [the] alien be granted a full
and fair hearing."177 The alien does not receive the due process
protection to which he is entitled if the statutory prerequisites are
171. El Rescate II, 941 F.2d at 956.
172. Id. (quoting Maldonado-Perez v. INS, 865 F.2d 328, 335 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). See
also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1992).
173. El Rescate II, 941 F.2d at 956. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1992).
174. El Rescate II, 941 F.2d at 956 (quoting United States v. Dekermenjian, 508
F.2d 812, 814 (9th Cir. 1974)).
175. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (1992). See Maldonado-Perez v. INS, 865 F.2d 328 (D.C.
Cir. 1989); United States v. Dekermenjian, 508 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1974).
176. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3) (1992). See Maldonado-Perez v. INS, 865 F.2d 328 (D.C.
Cir. 1989); United States v. Dekermenjian, 508 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1974).
177. Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 727 (9th Cir. 1980) (Ferguson, J., dissent-
ing) (citing Raminez v. INS, 550 F.2d 560, 563 (9th cir. 1977)), reh'g denied, 665 F.2d
269 (9th cir. 1981), cert denied, 465 U.S. 994 (1982)).
19921
Law and Inequality
not met.178 While the alien has a statutory right to be present, if
he has been given a reasonable opportunity to be present and
chooses not to exercise that right, the hearing may be held in his
absence.179 The Supreme Court has ruled that the hearing may be
conducted, even if the alien and his counsel are both in absentia.180
The alien's absence does not mean that the rest of the hear-
ing may proceed without regard for the fundamental fairness of
the hearing. In Maldonado-Perez, the court notes that minimal
procedural due process still requires a "meaningful or fair eviden-
tiary hearing."181 With respect to the issue in this case, if the alien
is not present, there is obviously no need for an interpreter unless
non-English speaking witnesses appear and interpretation is thus
needed solely for the benefit of preserving the record. The court
in Negron indicated that "considerations of fairness, the integrity
of the fact-finding process, and the potency of our adversary sys-
tem of justice forbid that the state should prosecute a defendant
who is not present at his own trial unless by his conduct he waives
that right."182 By not appearing, the alien waives his statutory
rights to cross examine witnesses, present evidence on his own be-
half, be represented by retained counsel and examine the evidence
against him.
The alien who does appear, however, should be able to reap
fully all of the benefits conferred upon him by these rights. The
district court examined the effect that lack of interpretation has
on each of these rights and concluded that "failure to require full
interpretation of immigration court proceedings seriously under-
mines the plaintiffs' statutory right[s]... ."183
Failure to fully interpret the proceedings deprives the non-
English speaking aliens of their statutory right to be present. 8 4
The district court cited Negron, which held that a proceeding con-
ducted without an interpreter results in a "babble of voices" for
the alien. 8 5 If the alien cannot understand what is being said,
then his right to be present is meaningless. Likewise, the dissent
in Tejeda-Mata made the point that "[p]resence can have no mean-
178. Tejeda-Mata, 626 F.2d at 727 (Ferguson, J., dissenting). See also Bridges v.
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); Hirsch v. INS, 308 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1992).
179. Dekermenjian, 508 F.2d at 813. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1992).
180. INS v. Lopez-Mendoze, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038-39 (1984).
181. Maldonado-Perez v. INS, 865 F.2d at 333.
182. See United States ez rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 389 (E.D.N.Y.
1970) (citations omitted).
183. El Rescate 1, 727 F. Supp. at 560.
184. Id-
185. Id (citing United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d at 388).
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ing absent comprehension."' 8 6 In Chung Young Chew v. Boyd, the
Ninth Circuit held that the alien was deprived of his statutory
rights because the immigration judge failed to inform petitioner
that he was entitled to counsel.1s7 The court had also failed to "as-
certain [petitioner's] ability to understand English, no interpreter
being present."ss
Failure to interpret also jeopardizes the alien's statutory right
to retained counsel. If the alien cannot comprehend the proceed-
ing, his ability to interact effectively with counsel and assist in his
own defense is seriously limited. 8 9 Counsel should not be re-
quired to both translate and to advocate zealously. Yet, unless the
alien fully understands the proceeding, he cannot point out
problems such as errors in witnesses' testimony; he cannot readily
provide counsel with information relevant to the case nor indicate
errors counsel may have made. The right to retained counsel in-
teracts significantly with the alien's rights to cross-examine wit-
nesses, to present evidence and to examine evidence against him.
If failure to interpret renders the right to counsel illusory, these
other rights also are seriously eroded. If the alien cannot under-
stand what is being said, he cannot provide meaningful assistance
in the cross-examination of witnesses, nor can he fully exercise
any of his other statutory rights.
Conclusion
Immigration court proceedings are civil rather than criminal
in nature. The due process protections afforded defendants in
criminal proceedings do not apply.190 The Immigration and Na-
tionality Act gives aliens in these proceedings certain statutory
rights. Courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals have recog-
nized that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause applies to
deportation hearings, requiring a full and fair hearing.191
In this case, plaintiffs alleged that their due process and stat-
utory rights were violated by the EOIR policy of refusing to fully
translate immigration court proceedings for non-English speaking
186. Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 728 (9th Cir. 1980) (Ferguson, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Ferguson felt that the denial of an interpreter should not be subject to
review under the harmless error standard. Id (citing Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18, 87 (1967)).
187. 309 F.2d 857, 862 n.12 (9th Cir. 1962).
188. Id-
189. El Rescate I, 727 F. Supp. at 561.
190. Tejeda-Mata, 626 F.2d at 726.




aliens.192 The court of appeals addressed the statutory due process
issue and overruled the district court's holding that statutory due
process requires full translation. 93 They held that statutory due
process requirements were satisfied by simply not preventing the
alien from providing his own interpreter.194
Only certain parts of immigration court proceedings are
translated for non-English speaking aliens.195 The parts trans-
lated, however, are not translated for the alien's benefit, but solely
for the benefit of the record, despite immigration judges' discretion
to require interpretation of various parts of the proceeding for the
alien's benefit.196 The EOIR has determined that the only por-
tions of a proceeding that require translation include 1) the immi-
gration judge's statements to the alien; 2) the examination of the
alien by counsel, the attorney for the INS, and the immigration
judge; and 3) the alien's responses to their questions.197 The immi-
gration judge, at his own discretion, may decide that it is necessary
that the alien to understand other dialogue so that he may assist in
the presentation of the case.198
The only elements of the proceeding that EOIR requires to
be translated into the alien's language are the statements to the
alien by the judge or questions put to him by counsel for either
side. This policy appears unrelated to fundamental fairness or to
providing the alien with a reasonable opportunity to assist in his
defense. Indeed, this policy seems purely for administrative con-
venience, since without this translation the alien would not be able
to testify at all and the record would be incomplete on appeal. The
policy unfairly leaves a large portion of the proceeding incompre-
hensible to the non-English speaking alien.
Numerous decisions have discussed the importance of trans-
lating the proceeding to safeguard due process rights; 99 some have
held that it is not necessary to interpret the entire proceeding,200
and some have found harmless error in the failure to interpret cer-
tain parts of the hearing.201 This note has reached the opposite
conclusion and has attempted to show that, by definition, funda-
192. El Rescate II, 941 F.2d at 952.
193. Id. at 956.
194. Id. at 955-56.




199. See discussion supra parts IV, V.A-D.
200. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
201. See Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 727 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 994 (1982).
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mental fairness calls for full translation.202 Anything less than
full translation results in an unfair disadvantage to the alien. Ad-
ditionally, it makes no sense to require that the proceeding be
translated at the district court level and yet not require it in immi-
gration courts. A hearing cannot be "full and fair" if the person
affected by it cannot understand the proceeding. The district court
stated, and this author agrees, that aliens' Fifth Amendment due
process rights should not be a matter for discretion and that
"[o]nly when the entire hearing is translated will those rights be
secure."
2 03
The EOIR's current policy of discretionary (selective) transla-
tion, cannot fully protect an alien's rights. Judges are unlikely to
recognize all of the portions of a proceeding for which translation
would benefit the alien. Unequal translation demands, coming
from different judges, provide inconsistent treatment and raise the
question of which aliens, if any, receive hearings which are "full
and fair." Any U.S. citizen subjected to an incomprehensible pro-
ceeding conducted in a foreign language would be justifiably out-
raged; yet this is exactly how many aliens are treated by our
immigration courts.204
When the alien exercises the statutory right to be present,
only full interpretation of the proceedings guarantees that his
other statutory rights will be recognized. If the witnesses' testi-
mony is not translated, the alien does not have a reasonable oppor-
tunity to cross-examine them or to examine the evidence against
him; if the alien cannot confer with counsel, he is denied the right
to retained counsel and the right to present evidence in his own
behalf; if he cannot understand what the judge, counsel, and wit-
nesses are saying at all stages of the proceeding, he is denied the
right to be present. The court of appeals felt that no denial of
rights occurs if the alien is not prevented from bringing his own
interpreter to the hearing. Unless an interpreter's competence is
certified in some way, however, there is still no preservation of the
alien's statutory rights; and if any or all of the above rights have
202. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 171-189.
203. El Rescate I, 727 F. Supp. at 563-64.
204. A footnote in the El Rescate I decision best shows the attitude that INS has
towards the aliens, English or non-English speaking, that appear before them.
Counsel for the defense made the following statement:
[E]ven if assuming that everything would be interpreted, it's unclear
whether the aliens would--and most of them are from poor communi-
ties-that they would really understand the meaning of what is hap-
pening in the immigration hearing.
727 F. Supp. at 561, n.5. The court responded, "This court finds counsel's inference
condescending and indicative of the defendant's lack of respect for the plaintiffs'
class." Id
1992]
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been denied to the alien, he has not had a reasonable opportunity
to be heard.
In conclusion, statutory due process and the Fifth Amend-
ment both necessitate full translation of immigration court pro-
ceedings to ensure that the hearing is full and fair and that the
alien has a reasonable opportunity to exercise his rights. On re-
mand, the district court should find that due process necessitates
full translation of immigration court proceedings. As the court in
Negron indicated, the non-English speaking alien's "incapacity to
respond to specific testimony would inevitably hamper the capac-
ity of his counsel to conduct effective cross-examination. Not only
for the sake of effective cross-examination, however, but as a mat-
ter of simple humaneness, [the alien] deserves more than to sit in
total incomprehension .... "205
205. United States ex reL Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d at 390 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
